

## Regional *Candida auris* Prevention and Response Strategy

### Introduction

Local health jurisdictions (LHJs) can use this Regional *Candida auris* Prevention and Response Strategy (“Response Phases”) document to guide prevention, response, mitigation activities, and recommendations that depend on local or regional *C. auris* epidemiology. The “Response Phases” document is designed to complement the *C. auris* Quicksheet<sup>1</sup> which provides response recommendations that LHJs would implement at all levels of *C. auris* endemicity. The recommendations described in this document are the minimum set of prevention and response activities and does not preclude LHJs from providing more stringent recommendations to their healthcare facilities.

The “Response Phases” recommendations are intended to prioritize those with the highest public health impact for a given level of endemicity:

- For non-endemic *C. auris* LHJs (Phase 2), *C. auris* screening considerations prioritize the highest yield activities while allowing flexibility for LHJs to be more stringent.
- In long-term acute care hospitals (LTACHs) where *C. auris* has become endemic (Phase 4), we include considerations for prioritizing intensified efforts to prevent adverse clinical outcomes (e.g., central line-associated bloodstream infections) with reduced emphasis on routine point prevalence surveys (PPS).

### Definitions

**Screening** refers to the collection of (typically) axilla/groin swabs to test for colonization in individuals exposed to or at risk of acquiring *C. auris*.

**Individuals at high risk** of *C. auris* acquisition include those:

- who are close healthcare contacts of a confirmed *C. auris* case, including roommates, those who shared a bathroom, those who occupy the same bedspace immediately after the index patient, and patients or residents on the same unit or in the same facility;
- mechanically ventilated or trached admitted to LTACHs or ventilator (subacute) units of skilled nursing facilities (vSNFs);
- admitted from facilities with known *C. auris* transmission;
- colonized or infected with a carbapenemase-producing organism (CPO), especially those requiring high-level care (e.g., indwelling medical devices, mechanical ventilation); and
- with international healthcare exposure in the last 12 months, especially those colonized or infected with a CPO.

**Facilities at high risk** of *C. auris* introduction and spread include:

- LTACHs
- vSNFs (particularly ventilator units)
- Acute care hospital (ACH) high-acuity units, e.g., intensive care, step-down, burn, and oncology units

## All Phases and Facilities

1. See *C. auris* Quicksheet for pathogen-specific response recommendations across all phases and facilities.<sup>1</sup>
2. All confirmed *C. auris* cases must be reported to public health.
3. Ensure laboratories can correctly identify *C. auris*,<sup>2</sup> and healthcare facilities have access to routine *C. auris* screening resources outside of public health (e.g., polymerase chain reaction (PCR) testing through a clinical or commercial lab).<sup>3</sup>
  - There are a growing number of labs with PCR testing capacity.<sup>3</sup> Public health can continue to engage new labs, including reference labs serving high-risk individuals to bring on *C. auris* screening testing.
  - PCR is preferred over culture-based testing due to the shorter turn-around-time which can enable more prompt response to cases.
  - Prioritize engaging facilities admitting high-risk individuals; identify successful or innovative strategies to engage facilities (especially SNFs, vSNFs) to use these resources.
4. Promote antimicrobial stewardship (AS) in all healthcare facilities.
  - Ensure appropriate use of broad-spectrum antibiotics and antifungals; e.g., do not treat organisms isolated from non-sterile sites without evidence of infection.
  - Engage facility leadership on implementation of core elements, including:
    - who is responsible for AS in the facility;
    - how the facility is tracking or monitoring antimicrobial use, and for which antimicrobials; and
    - whether the facility has a process for reassessing the indication and duration for antimicrobial prescriptions.
  - Encourage participation in CDPH AS initiatives,<sup>4</sup> including the AS Program Honor Roll and multidrug-resistant organism (MDRO) prevention collaboratives.<sup>5</sup>
5. Implement Enhanced Standard Precautions (ESP) facility-wide in all SNFs for all residents with risk factors for MDRO transmission (e.g., wounds, indwelling devices).<sup>6</sup> In units where *C. auris* transmission has been identified, place residents known to be *C. auris*-positive on Contact Precautions pending containment of transmission. Other long-term care settings (e.g., assisted living facilities) may adapt ESP for known *C. auris*-positive individuals.

### Phase 1. No *C. auris* cases in LHJ: Prevention

1. Engage LTACHs to:
  - a. conduct proactive initial and follow-up onsite infection prevention and control (IPC) assessments, education, and outreach in coordination with the HAI Program;
  - b. conduct proactive baseline PPS and consider 3-6 monthly proactive PPS;
  - c. conduct admission screening;
  - d. use List P agent<sup>7</sup> (List K or bleach if not accessible) for facility-wide daily and terminal cleaning and disinfection; and
  - e. ensure clinical lab performs species identification of *Candida* isolates from normally sterile and non-sterile sites or enroll in the Antibiotic Resistance (AR) Lab Network Targeted Surveillance Program.<sup>8</sup>

2. Engage vSNFs to:
  - a. conduct proactive initial and follow-up onsite IPC assessments, education, and outreach in coordination with the HAI Program;
  - b. conduct proactive baseline PPS in vent unit and consider 6-12 monthly proactive PPS; and
  - c. use List P agent<sup>7</sup> (List K or bleach if not accessible) for daily and terminal cleaning and disinfection in vent unit, and consider using the disinfectant facility-wide for additional prevention.
  - d. consider screening testing and ensuring Enhanced Standard Precautions are implemented for residents admitted to the vent unit from LTACHs or other facilities with known *C. auris* transmission.
3. Engage ACHs to:
  - a. ensure clinical lab performs species identification of *Candida* isolates from sterile sites, and consider species identification in non-sterile sites or enroll in the AR Lab Network Targeted Surveillance Program<sup>8</sup>; and
  - b. consider screening testing and placing on empiric Contact Precautions patients admitted with indwelling devices or mechanically ventilated from SNFs, in addition to high-risk patients.
4. Engage all ACHs, SNFs, LTACHs in routine (e.g., monthly) calls.
  - a. Conduct education and outreach (may coordinate with HAI Program).
  - b. Promote interfacility communication.
  - c. Pair ACH infection preventionist (IP) (mentors) with SNF IP in patient referral networks.
  - d. Encourage participation in CDPH MDRO prevention collaborative(s) as relevant.<sup>5</sup>
5. Follow up on all discharges from known outbreak facilities (intra- and inter-LHJ).
  - a. Screen and place on empiric Contact Precautions in coordination with the HAI Program.
6. Consider combining *C. auris* and **carbapenemase-producing organism (CPO) prevention activities**<sup>9</sup> when feasible, including:
  - a. in LTACHs, conduct admission screening and proactive baseline and follow-up CPO PPS facility-wide;
  - b. in vSNFs, conduct proactive baseline and follow-up CPO PPS facility-wide; and
  - c. in ACHs, conduct CPO screening testing and place on empiric Contact Precautions patients admitted with indwelling devices or mechanically ventilated from SNFs, in addition to high-risk patients.

## Phase 2. Newly identified case(s) in LHJ: Aggressive Containment + Prevention

For Phase 2 responses, an outbreak is defined as:

1. 1+ newly identified case during PPS in response to a known case **OR**
2. 2+ cases identified within 4 weeks of each other in the same unit or epidemiologically linked\*

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\* Epidemiologically linked includes having previous admission at the same healthcare facility (in last year), **OR** common primary or consultative service, healthcare personnel, bathroom, procedure, or device. This outbreak facility definition excludes 2+ cases tested within 24 hours from time of admission, and not epi-linked to any other cases at the facility.

**A. Single case investigation**

1. If the LHI is responding to a single *C. auris* case (see screening decision tree on page 6):
  - a. In LTACHs and vSNFs
    - i. Conduct a PPS facility-wide in LTACHs or in vSNF vent units.
      - If initial PPS is negative, repeat PPS after two weeks. If the second PPS is negative, continue preventive PPS in vSNFs (6-monthly) and LTACHs (3-monthly).
      - If initial or repeat PPS is positive, see section B below.
    - ii. In ACHs and SNFs
      - i. Screen high-risk healthcare contacts, regardless of whether the index patient was being managed with Contact Precautions, or Enhanced Standard Precautions in SNFs or vSNFs.
      - ii. In ACH units with increased risk of outbreaks consider conducting a PPS.
        - If initial PPS is negative, discontinue PPS.
        - If initial PPS is positive, see section B below.
  - b. In ACHs and SNFs
    - i. Screen high-risk healthcare contacts, regardless of whether the index patient was being managed with Contact Precautions, or Enhanced Standard Precautions in SNFs or vSNFs.
    - ii. In ACH units with increased risk of outbreaks consider conducting a PPS.
      - If initial PPS is negative, discontinue PPS.
      - If initial PPS is positive, see section B below.
  - c. If additional *C. auris* screening or clinical cases are identified, see section B below.
2. Conduct initial IPC assessment, education, and outreach; coordinate with HAI Program as relevant.
3. Recommend use of List P agent<sup>7</sup> (List K or bleach if not accessible) for daily and terminal cleaning and disinfection: facility-wide in vSNFs and LTACHs; affected unit(s) in ACHs; and affected resident's room in SNFs. Consider expanding to high-acuity units or facility-wide in ACHs as resources allow.
4. Conduct retrospective and prospective lab surveillance.
  - a. Conduct microbiologic record review to identify any *C. auris* cases that might have been unrecognized during the past 3 months.
  - b. Identify the species of all *Candida* isolates from any specimen source for at least 3 months after the initial positive *C. auris* isolate was identified.

**B. Two or more cases or transmission is suspected**


1. If transmission is suspected or ongoing in a healthcare facility (see screening decision tree on page 6):
  - a. Conduct a PPS. If LTACH, conduct PPS facility-wide; if vSNF, PPS in vent unit; if ACH or SNF, PPS in the affected unit(s).
  - b. Once the healthcare facility has 2 consecutively negative PPS at 2-week intervals **AND** no new clinical cases during the PPS screening window:
    - i. For ACHs and SNFs, discontinue biweekly PPS.
    - ii. For LTACHs and vSNFs, reduce PPS frequency to monthly for 3 months; if negative, move to 3-monthly if LTACH, and 6-monthly if vSNF.
    - iii. If low-level transmission continues in LTACH or vSNF, see **Phase 3**.
2. For patients or residents discharged prior to PPS, at the receiving facility, implement empiric Contact Precautions, or Enhanced Standard Precautions in SNFs or vSNFs for transfers with unknown or negative *C. auris* status, including communication to outside LHI.
  - a. Refer to Phase 2 screening decision tree for discharge screening and tracking considerations

3. Continue follow-up IPC assessments at outbreak facility and retrospective and prospective surveillance.
4. Recommend use of List P agent<sup>7</sup> (List K or bleach if not accessible) for daily and terminal cleaning and disinfection: facility-wide in vSNFs and LTACHs; affected unit(s) in ACHs and SNFs. Consider expanding to high-acuity units or facility-wide in ACHs as resources allow.
5. Consider disseminating weekly outbreak facility list to all healthcare facility IPs intra-jurisdictionally, and inter-jurisdictionally as applicable.
6. Facilities alert LHJ when transferring patients with *C. auris*.
  - a. LHJ follows up on all positive *C. auris* transfer patients to ensure implementation of appropriate transmission-based precautions and IPC measures.

### **C. Single case investigation**

1. If the LHJ is responding to a single *C. auris* case (see screening decision tree on page 6):
  - a. In LTACHs and vSNFs
    - i. Conduct a PPS facility-wide in LTACHs or in vSNF vent units.
      - If initial PPS is negative, repeat PPS after two weeks. If the second PPS is negative, continue preventive PPS in vSNFs (6-monthly) and LTACHs (3-monthly).
      - If initial or repeat PPS is positive, see section B below.
    - b. In ACHs and SNFs
      - i. Screen high-risk healthcare contacts, regardless of whether the index patient was being managed with Contact Precautions, or Enhanced Standard Precautions in SNFs or vSNFs.
      - ii. In ACH units with increased risk of outbreaks consider conducting a PPS.
        - If initial PPS is negative, discontinue PPS.
        - If initial PPS is positive, see section B below.
  - c. If additional *C. auris* screening or clinical cases are identified, see section B below.
2. Conduct initial IPC assessment, education, and outreach; coordinate with HAI Program as relevant.
3. Recommend use of List P agent<sup>7</sup> (List K or bleach if not accessible) for daily and terminal cleaning and disinfection: facility-wide in vSNFs and LTACHs; affected unit(s) in ACHs; and affected resident's room in SNFs. Consider expanding to high-acuity units or facility-wide in ACHs as resources allow.
4. Conduct retrospective and prospective lab surveillance.
  - a. Conduct microbiologic record review to identify any *C. auris* cases that might have been unrecognized during the past 3 months.
  - b. Identify the species of all *Candida* isolates from any specimen source for at least 3 months after the initial positive *C. auris* isolate was identified.

# Screening Decision Tree for Local Health Departments (LHDs) Conducting Phase 2 Responses<sup>1</sup>



**Notes**

- **High-risk contact** is defined as a roommate (including patients in the same open bay unit); patient/resident who shared a bathroom with the index patient/resident; or patient/resident occupying the same bed space immediately following the index patient/resident.<sup>6</sup>
- LHD can **consider screening additional contacts who do not meet high-risk criteria**. Prioritize contacts discharged to higher acuity settings (e.g., LTACH, vSNF vent unit, ACH).<sup>7</sup>
- If a contact (high-risk or otherwise) is **discharged home**, screening at home is not recommended.
- In some situations, broader screening may not be indicated.<sup>8</sup>

## Screening Decision Tree Definitions and Considerations

- <sup>1</sup> Please see [CDPH Prevention and Response Strategy document](#) (PDF) to identify your LHD's phase for relevant Tier 2 antimicrobial-resistant (AR) pathogen prevention and response activities. ([www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/Cauris\\_Phases.pdf](http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/Cauris_Phases.pdf))
- <sup>2</sup> [Tier 2 AR](#) (PDF) ([www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/ARPathogenTiers.pdf](http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/ARPathogenTiers.pdf)) pathogens are those not commonly detected in California (although epidemiology can vary by region within California), for example: *Candida auris*, non-KPC-producing Enterobacterales, carbapenemase-producing *Pseudomonas* species (spp.) and *Acinetobacter* spp. (excluding OXA-23-, OXA-24/40-, and OXA-58-like carbapenemases).
- <sup>3</sup> In addition to ACHs and SNFs, this could apply to other congregate care settings including but not limited to assisted living facilities, group homes, and board & care facilities, prioritizing residents with risk factors for AR pathogen acquisition or transmission (e.g., presence of indwelling device or unhealed wound, total dependence on others for assistance with activities of daily living, or frequent healthcare exposure).
- <sup>4</sup> High-risk contacts should be screened regardless of whether the index patient or resident was being managed with Contact Precautions or Enhanced Standard Precautions and regardless of the amount of time they overlapped with the index patient or resident.
- <sup>5</sup> LHD can consider PPS in ACH units with increased risk of transmission in situations including, but not limited to, healthcare settings with high-acuity patients with longer lengths of stay (e.g., 1 week); or if it will take time to identify high-risk contacts or if most high-risk contacts have been discharged from a unit/healthcare facility. This generally excludes the emergency department.
- <sup>6</sup> The highest yield is likely to be the patient exposed to Tier 2 pathogen contamination following a single terminal cleaning. Subsequent patients occupying the same bed space, including current occupant(s) may be considered for screening if feasible.
- <sup>7</sup> Considerations for pursuing screening of additional contacts who do not meet high-risk criteria can include, but are not limited to, contacts who shared a common primary or consultative service, healthcare personnel, procedure, or device; or contacts who have risk factors for AR pathogen acquisition (e.g., presence of indwelling device or unhealed wound, total dependence on others for assistance with activities of daily living receive high-level care).
- <sup>8</sup> In some situations, broader screening may not be recommended by public health. For example, if the index patient's length of stay was very short (e.g., <24 hours), screening may not be indicated. During a response to a single case in an ACH unit with a short average length of stay where patients are ambulatory and not mechanically ventilated, broader screening could be limited to situations where the index patient is currently admitted or recently discharged (<7 days prior). See [CDC Containment Strategy](#) ([www.cdc.gov/hai/mdro-guides/containment-strategy.html](http://www.cdc.gov/hai/mdro-guides/containment-strategy.html)).

**Phase 3. Ongoing transmission in at least one high-risk facility for > 6 months in LHJ:****Mitigation**

1. Routine PPS
  - a. In LTACHs, continue monthly PPS; if <2 cases per PPS for 3 consecutive months, decrease to 3-monthly PPS.
  - b. In vSNFs, continue monthly PPS; if <2 cases per PPS for 3 consecutive months, decrease to 3-6 monthly PPS depending on *C. auris*-positive resident burden.
2. Admission screening + empiric Contact Precautions
  - a. Continue admission screening at LTACHs.
  - b. Consider admission screening at vSNFs (vent unit only) and rescreen residents if readmitted after >24 hours hospital admission; transition to ESP if no transmission in facility.
  - c. Consider admission screening at ACHs for high-risk patients, if not already done.
3. Recommend use of List P agent<sup>7</sup> (List K or bleach if not accessible) for daily and terminal cleaning and disinfection: facility-wide in vSNFs and LTACHs; affected unit(s) in SNFs; and affected and high-acuity units in ACHs. Consider facility-wide in ACHs as resources allow.
4. Transition from LHJ- to facility-led discharge screening and notification for *C. auris*-exposed and -confirmed individuals; LHJ continues notifying outside LHJ of interjurisdictional transfer cases.
5. Ensure all clinical labs perform species identification of *Candida* isolates from normally sterile and non-sterile sites, or enroll in the AR Lab Network Targeted Surveillance Program.<sup>8</sup>
6. Implement Phase 2 activities if:
  - a. *C. auris* case(s) identified in previously naïve facility;
  - b. new outbreak (higher-than-expected number of cases) in a non-naïve facility; or
  - c. *C. auris* case identified with unusual resistance pattern, strain, or other epi (e.g., echinocandin- or pan-resistant, Clade I, II, IV, V, or transfer from out-of-state or abroad).
7. Engage facilities to mitigate morbidity and mortality from invasive *C. auris* infection (particularly bloodstream).
  - a. Prioritize individuals with lines, tubes, or drains, particularly central venous catheters (CVC).
    - i. Focus on appropriate use and care of medical devices, especially CVC insertion and maintenance practices.
    - ii. Incorporate central line-associated bloodstream infection (CLABSI) prevention and guidance<sup>10</sup> in LTACHs and vSNF vent units during public health onsite IPC assessments.
  - b. There are no specific recommendations for chlorhexidine (CHG) bathing or decolonization for *C. auris*.

**Phase 4. Ongoing transmission in at least one high-risk facility for >1 year in LHJ, and some surrounding LHJs with highly-connected patient sharing networks: Maintenance****Considerations for LTACHs**

In individual LTACHs where *C. auris* has become endemic despite 1+ year of public health support to mitigate transmission, LHJ can consider shifting prioritization to intensified efforts at preventing adverse clinical outcomes. This shift would occur with continued broad IPC measures but reduced emphasis on PPS. Specifically, these LTACHs should:

1. Intensify measures to prevent invasive *C. auris* infections (e.g., implementing adherence monitoring of central line insertion and maintenance practices to prevent CLABSI)
2. Conduct ongoing surveillance of clinical isolates to identify *C. auris* strains that are unusual in California or more resistant (e.g., non-Clade III *C. auris* isolates, isolates with echinocandin resistance, or pan-resistant strains)
3. Identify and respond to clusters of invasive *C. auris* disease (e.g., by conducting a PPS)
4. Reinforce broad IPC measures including adherence monitoring and feedback of hand hygiene and personal protective equipment (PPE) practices, and environmental cleaning and disinfection.
5. Continue to do admission screening + empiric Contact Precautions for all new and re-admissions to the LTACH.

### Considerations for ACHs, vSNFs, and SNFs

Continue efforts to prevent introduction and contain spread of *C. auris* in other facilities including those in the same patient sharing network of endemic LTACHs.

1. Facilities perform screening testing in response to an increase in cases until 2 consecutive PPS at least 2 weeks apart result in  $\leq 2$  cases or the facility's baseline PPS percent positivity.
  - a. For vSNFs, after two consecutively negative PPS at 2-week intervals, reduce PPS frequency to monthly for 3 months; if vSNF continues to maintain  $\leq 2$  cases or baseline PPS percent positivity, move to 6-monthly.
2. Perform admission screening + Enhanced Standard Precautions (if SNF or vSNF) or Standard Precautions (if ACH)<sup>†</sup>:
  - a. in vSNFs, of all new and re-admissions (after >24 hours hospital admission) to vent unit only;
  - b. in ACHs, of high-risk new and re-admissions;
  - c. in SNFs, of high-risk residents as resources allow.

### Considerations for all healthcare facilities

1. Facilities are responsible for knowing baseline *C. auris* prevalence or incidence, conducting ongoing surveillance for sterile and non-sterile site isolates, investigation and reporting to public health when a new outbreak is identified, and conducting PPS. Examples of new outbreaks can include:
  - a. evidence of *C. auris* transmission in a previously naïve facility;
  - b. cluster of cases in a distinct patient or resident population or unit;
  - c. increase of cases above baseline occurring in a non-naïve facility;
  - d. increase in clinical cases (e.g., bloodstream) detected within a facility.
2. For facilities identifying single *C. auris* cases in the absence of ongoing transmission, screen high-risk healthcare contacts.
  - a. Consider broader screening if there is evidence of a new outbreak (see 1a.-d. above).
3. Public health may provide assistance depending on size and scope of the outbreak, as resources allow.
4. LHJ may conduct or recommend routine IPC assessments or PPS.

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<sup>†</sup> Implement Contact Precautions if there is suspected or confirmed transmission in the unit or facility.

5. Use of List P agent<sup>7</sup> (List K or bleach if not accessible) for daily and terminal cleaning and disinfection facility-wide in SNFs, vSNFs, LTACHs, and ACHs.
6. Facilities are responsible for all interfacility communication.
7. LHJ supports strong IPC and AS practices in all facilities, and continues engaging facilities to mitigate morbidity and mortality from invasive *C. auris* infection (particularly bloodstream).

## References

1. [CDPH \*C. auris\* Quicksheet](#) (PDF)  
([www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/CaurisQuicksheet.pdf](http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/CaurisQuicksheet.pdf))
2. [CDC Identification of \*C. auris\*](#) ([www.cdc.gov/fungal/candida-auris/identification.html](http://www.cdc.gov/fungal/candida-auris/identification.html))
3. [LACDPH List of Laboratories with \*C. auris\* Testing Capacity](#) (PDF)  
([publichealth.lacounty.gov/acd/docs/List\\_C.aurisLabs.pdf](http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/acd/docs/List_C.aurisLabs.pdf))
4. [CDPH AS website](#)  
([www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/Pages/AntimicrobialStewardshipLandingPage.aspx](http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/Pages/AntimicrobialStewardshipLandingPage.aspx))
5. [CDPH MDRO Prevention Collaboratives website](#)  
([www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/Pages/Regional\\_AR\\_Collaboratives.aspx](http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/Pages/Regional_AR_Collaboratives.aspx))
6. [CDPH Enhanced Standard Precautions website](#)  
([www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/Pages/ESP.aspx](http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/Pages/ESP.aspx))
7. [Environmental Protection Agency \(EPA\) List P Agents with Claims against \*C. auris\*](#)  
([www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/list-p-antimicrobial-products-registered-epa-claims-against-candida-auris](http://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/list-p-antimicrobial-products-registered-epa-claims-against-candida-auris))
8. [AR Lab Network Targeted Surveillance Program](#) (PDF)  
([www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/CDPH Document Library/CDPH\\_ARLN\\_TargetedSurveillanceDescription\\_052521.pdf](http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/CDPH_ARLN_TargetedSurveillanceDescription_052521.pdf))
9. [CDPH Carbapenem-resistant and Carbapenemase-producing Organisms website](#)  
([www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/Pages/CRE\\_InfectionPreventionStrategies.aspx](http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/Pages/CRE_InfectionPreventionStrategies.aspx))
10. [Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America \(SHEA\) Strategies to Prevent CLABSI in Acute Care Hospitals: 2022 Update](#)  
([www.cambridge.org/core/journals/infection-control-and-hospital-epidemiology/article/strategies-to-prevent-central-line-associated-bloodstream-infections-in-acute-care-hospitals-2022-update/01DC7C8BBEA1F496BC20C6E0EF634E3D](http://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/infection-control-and-hospital-epidemiology/article/strategies-to-prevent-central-line-associated-bloodstream-infections-in-acute-care-hospitals-2022-update/01DC7C8BBEA1F496BC20C6E0EF634E3D))

## Additional Resources

- [CDPH \*C. auris\* website](#)  
([www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/Pages/Candida-auris.aspx](http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/Pages/Candida-auris.aspx))
- [CDPH \*C. auris\* Screening Decision Tree](#) (PDF)  
([www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/Tier2\\_Pathogen\\_Screening\\_Decision\\_Tree.pdf](http://www.cdph.ca.gov/Programs/CHCQ/HAI/CDPH%20Document%20Library/Tier2_Pathogen_Screening_Decision_Tree.pdf))
- [Los Angeles County \*C. auris\* Mitigation Strategy](#) (PDF)  
([publichealth.lacounty.gov/acd/docs/MitigatingSpreadofC.aurisLAC.pdf](http://publichealth.lacounty.gov/acd/docs/MitigatingSpreadofC.aurisLAC.pdf))
- [CDC MDRO Containment Guidelines](#)  
([www.cdc.gov/hai/containment/guidelines.html](http://www.cdc.gov/hai/containment/guidelines.html))